

THE EMERGENCE OF VARIOUS KINDS OF MEANING THROUGH THE FORMULATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF JUDGMENTS IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDMUND HUSSERL

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I. Is Predication Possible through the Various Syntheses of Objectification in Husserl's Theory of Judgment?

Recently, Husserl's phenomenological explanation of the formulation of predicative judgments has been seriously called into question. It seems that the mechanics of Husserl's theory of judgment do *not* provide an adequate epistemological analysis of either simple or complex predicative judgments.¹ Husserlian phenomenology does not make possible a correct comprehension of exactly how predication occurs when a judgment is made. Although some insight from phenomenology may be helpful toward understanding predication, the Husserlian account is unreliable. It can not be taken as a basic guide toward the comprehension of predicative judgments without careful scrutiny. A critical appraisal of it seems to yield a fundamentally misdirected effort on the part of phenomenology. This is the case which has been presented against Husserlian phenomenology.

It is my contention that Husserl's analysis of predicative judgment explains how predication takes place in the formulation of judgments. This contention may be sustained on the basis of the validity of various syntheses of objectification in his theory of judgment. These syntheses give rise to the various types of objectivities in both simple and complex judgments. These objectivities actually accomplish the task of predication itself. They also furnish the basis for the emergence of different kinds of meaning. Hence, Husserl's account of syntheses, objectivities, and meanings comprises the core of his theory of predicative judgment. Our analysis will focus sharply upon these three topics in particular since they form the skeleton of Husserl's theory of judgment. They compose the fundamental elements of objectification in Husserl's theory of predication.

Any external criticism of Husserl's theory of judgment should address itself to the theory with the appropriate epistemological considerations in mind. Attacks upon the philosophical legitimacy of intentionality, noesis–noema, and the reference to an object are made commonly against phenomenology. The starting point for the methodology of any particular philosophy may be called into question. Phenomenological philosophy may possess a unique beginning with its

assumption of certain attitudes and the performance of various reductions. It is unlikely that epistemology can begin more firmly with the analysis of linguistic expressions and the consideration of surface grammar. Phenomenology's richly detailed revelations of the inner workings of conscious activity may become suspect. However, it is even less likely that linguistic analysis' depth grammar will advance philosophy's inquiry into our ways of knowing or our types of cognition. It seems to me that neither the definitely profound problems nor the carefully proposed solutions of phenomenological philosophy can be ignored without irreparable loss. Husserlian phenomenology has moved epistemology forward.

Any internal critique of Husserl's account of predication must do full justice to phenomenology itself. For example, the dismissal of predicative syntheses and the denial of the authenticity of ideational activity deprive phenomenology of the conceptual means by which it attempts to account for predication in judgments. Additional assertions of representation or presentation as a fictitious concept and thetic qualities of conscious acts as devoid of reference to objects prevent Husserl from doing phenomenology at all.² A more informative criticism would examine phenomenology's explanations in accordance with the criterion of internal logical consistency. Its objective should be the elucidation of crucial logical flaws, rather than the rejection of basic concepts. Internal criticism presupposes at least a tentative acceptance of its subject before it conducts its analysis for the purpose of locating any fundamental mistakes.

The claim that intuition as a philosophical method does not present certain representations is unwarranted. The absence of a certain mental appearance is attributed usually to the phenomenologist in particular, rather than to the method in general. Likewise, if predication is to be understood phenomenologically, nominalization as a type of objectification must be accepted as integral to different syntheses. It is, once again, the basic means by which predication occurs through the thematization of noetic activity. Without nominalization there would be no objectivities which bear different kinds of meanings. It is as philosophically necessary to objectification as intuition is to phenomenology.

Serious external and internal criticisms of Husserl's theory of predicative judgment may be considered as shortsighted if their analyses never extend beyond his early writings. The linguistic and logical problems of *Logical Investigations* were treated as merely preliminary matters. It is well known that Husserl was never satisfied either with his solutions to these problems or with their acceptance within the intellectual community. A closer study of Husserl's theory of predicative judgments necessitates serious consideration of his later works, in particular *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Experience and Judgment*. His fully developed account of how predication occurs in the formulation of predicative judgments may be found in the latter of these two important treatises.

Careful examination of *Experience and Judgment* reveals his theory of predication in rich detail. Speaking generally, his theory of judgment entails an upward development of meanings, structures, and types of judgments within a hierarchical framework. Although his phenomenological investigation results in an extraordi-

narly rich description of the cognitive formulation of different types of judgments, this present study will consider only the basic essentials of his theory. The theme of our study will reverberate around the equation: "meaning = categorial objectivity + type of judgment". In other words, meanings emerge from the constitution of categorial objectivities through the formulation of different types of judgments.

Since Husserl's phenomenological inquiry into predicative judgment yields rather complicated results, it might be useful to sketch very briefly the bare outline of his theory. This theory of judgment possesses a hierarchical framework. A pair of judgments is formulated upon each level of a three-tiered hierarchy. Careful scrutiny of each level reveals the bifurcation of that level into two sublevels. On each of these particular sublevels, three events occur in accordance with the basic equation of judgment formation: (1) the constitution of a categorial objectivity, (2) the formulation of a type of judgment, and (3) the emergence of a kind of meaning. These three events take place concomitantly whenever a judgment is formulated.

Is predication possible through various syntheses of objectification in accordance with this phenomenological theory of judgment? It is this author's belief that it is. The question of *why* predication is possible in this manner is answerable in terms of *how* predication occurs. In other words, the defense of Husserl's account of logical predication may be made through a detailed exposition of his theory of predicative judgment.³ Predication takes place through the objectifying activity of various types of syntheses. These syntheses operate in order to attribute predicates to a subject and to rethematize entire expressions upon higher levels of conscious activity. The cognitive aspect of logical predication becomes intelligible in terms of the ideational activity of these syntheses. I do not think that it can be explained as well in accordance with linguistic "rules of use". The Husserlian account of predication demonstrates the various underlying syntheses which function whenever a judgment is made.

It was mentioned earlier that meanings emerge from categorial objectivities through the formulation of various types of judgments. Likewise, it may be said that predication occurs through syntheses of objectification on the basis of their intrinsic operations. It is our contention that Husserl's phenomenological account of the formulation of predicative judgment describes accurately the epistemological foundations of logical predication. A comprehensive explanation of the relationship between logical predicates and synthetic acts of consciousness is found in the writings of the later Husserl. It is our intention that the subsequent presentation of Husserl's theory of categorial judgment answers the question of how predication is possible.

This analysis of Husserl's theory of categorial judgment serves the purposes of contributing to Husserlian scholarship and of responding to some serious criticism of the fundamental concepts of phenomenology. The former of these two objectives is the more important. In conjunction with these two aims, it is hoped that the basic question of the possibility of logical predication will be answered. The Husserlian account of the formulation of predicative judgments is also his explanation for the possibility of logical predication. The following analysis is offered as a resolu-

tion to this matter of intellectual interest.

II. The Perceptual Awareness of the Individuals within Pre-predicative Experience

If phenomenological reduction reveals the categorial objectivities of different types of judgments, then we obtain a uniform overview of the judgments' various contents of meaning. For instance, the general objectivities of judgments "in general" are reducible to the predicative states of affairs of complex categorial judgments. The syntactical objectivities of complex categorial judgments are reducible to the categorial objectivities of simple categorial judgments, which are reducible to the "objects-about-which" or the objects of judgments of perception. The objects of judgments of perception present individual objects of pre-predicative experience to the perceiver. Speaking more technically, these individuals of pre-predicative experience are elementary, nonsyntactical ultimate cores.⁴ The individuals of pre-predicative experience in perceptual activity are the "building blocks" or the foundation of cognition. These individual substrates of pre-predicative experience may be intuited adequately. As the ultimate cores of primitive meanings, they are intuited simply as the individuals of perceptual experience. Cognitional activity begins precisely here with those component parts which must be synthesized later into whole objects of perception through the formulation of judgments of perception.

More specifically, this reduction of judgments to their ultimate cores occurs in three distinct ways: (1) regarding the substrate, (2) regarding the attribute, and (3) regarding the elementary forms.⁵ The first way yields noncategorial cores which are the basis for perceived objects in perceptual experience. The second way results in the appearance of the original adjective or attribute of a substrate as an irreducible form. This primitive form is operative throughout the cognitive activity of explicating the properties of an object in contemplative perception on the first level of conscious activity.⁶ The third way reveals the ultimate forms of subjects, predicates, and relations themselves. These elementary forms function as prelogical ones in the perceived objects of perceptual experience. All three different types of ultimate cores comprise the individuals of pre-predicate experience (i.e., perceptual activity). Each kind of ultimate core becomes cognizable as a consequence of the particular way of performing the phenomenological reduction. The result of the reduction is the appearance of the component parts of perceived objects in perceptual experience. These pieces of phenomenological data are the products of perceptual activity alone. They are not yet involved in the formulation of the first type of judgments (i.e., judgments of perception). In other words, as prelogical forms, these components are forerunners of the objectivities of judgments of perception. As contents of meaning, these ultimate cores within elementary forms bear perceptual sense. They make possible the meaning of perceptual experience (i.e., pre-predicative experience) itself. It should be added that objects of perception are *not* yet presented in cognition. At this stage, perceived objects appear within conscious

activity in an unclear and indistinct manner of perception. Perception has occurred merely in an informal, incoherent way. Nevertheless, perceptual experience begins at this point; it then continues in a more developed fashion through the formulation of judgments of perception.

The individuals of pre-predicative experience become more prominent through the formulation of judgments of perception. In the case of judgments of perceptions, however, *objects* of perception are presented with objective sense. This type of judgment constitutes initially distinct objects within our perceptual field. In the Husserlian framework, perceived objects with perceptual sense are apprehended in perceptual experience upon the lower sublevel of the first level of conscious activity. Within the same context, the objects of perception with objective sense are presented through the formulation of judgments of perception upon the higher sublevel of the first level of conscious activity. It is apparent that these two types of cognition in reference to perception occur in a symmetrical fashion. The striking characteristic of sheer perceptual experience is its absence of determinateness. Cognition actually begins with a morass of undetermined apprehensions. On the other hand, the contrasting feature of judgments of perception is the presence of determinateness in its individual objects. With this first type of judgment, perception transcends the indefiniteness of perceptual activity in order to present within consciousness the definite objects of pre-predicative experience.

It may be appropriate at this point to synthesize the essence of these remarks concerning the beginning of Husserl's theory of judgment. The proper or genuine task of judgment theory is a phenomenological clarification of the genesis of the sense of judgments.⁷ A phenomenological inquiry must lay bare the origin of the sense of judgments. There must be discovered and enunciated a principle of genetic order of judgmental forms and their materialities. The uncovering of the genesis of the sense of judgments entails the unraveling of both the formal and material aspects of various kinds of sense. Different kinds of sense (e.g., logical, judgment, objective, and perceptual) may be retraced genetically from more complex types to simpler types. Perhaps a very concrete example may illustrate the consequences of this tracing. The judgment sense of "the red box is large" (i.e., "*sp* is *q*") is founded upon the objective sense of "the box is red" and "large" (i.e., "*s* is *p*" and "*q*"). Likewise, the objective sense of "the box is red" (i.e., "*s* is *p*") is reducible to the perceptual sense of the box "is" red (i.e., *s* "is" *p*). Thus, genetic tracing of meaning results in a hierarchy of senses. Each of these various kinds of sense permits further sense-explication.

For our concern, the phenomenological clarification of sense-genesis leads to the individual objects of pre-predicative experience.⁸ These individuals of original, experiential judgments are present within the ultimate cores of higher-level predicative judgments. The first task of judgment theory is the genetic tracing of predicative evidences back to pre-predicative experience. The results of pre-predicative experience enter later into judgmental formations. These judgmental forms develop systematically from the level of pre-predication to higher levels of predication and generality. Conversely, these higher judgmental forms relate indirectly to the

ultimate cores of original, experiential judgments. If the genuine sense of categorial judgments is clarified, then the intentionality of predicative judgments leads back to the intentionality of pre-predicative experience. For example, in the case of pre-predicative experience founding, primitive experience itself has a kind of *informal* syntax as a part of its composition.⁹ This informal syntax comprises the structure of the prelogical form (e.g., *s* “is” *p*) of perceived objects through *explicit* thematization.¹⁰ The prelogical form (e.g., *s* “is” *p*) is presupposed by the predicative structure (e.g., “*s* is *p*”) of objects of perception in *explicit* thematization. This former form is separate from the latter structure. It comprises the foundation upon which higher judgmental forms are constituted within more complex types of judgments.

The pre-predicative experience of individuals is presupposed by predicative judgments. Without individual objects of experience, there would be no content to the categorial formations of predicative judgments. In other words, the structure of predicative judgments would not refer to anything in experience. Predicative judgments encompass as their material content the individual objects of pre-predicative experience. These individuals of judgments of perception in conjunction with the perceived objects of perceptual experience designate the origin within cognition for the formulation of various types of predicative judgments.

III. The Appearance of Categorialia within Predicative Judgments

Further phenomenological investigation discloses the appearance of categorialia (i.e., categorial objects) upon the lower sublevel of the second level of conscious activity. These categorialia have their origin in the prelogical form (i.e., *s* “is” *p*) of implicitly thematized original, evidential judgments. The predicative structure (e.g., “*s* is *p*”) of categorialia develops from prelogical forms through the formulation of explicitly thematized categorial judgments. This predicative structure had been examined already as part of categorial syntax in the field of analytic logic.¹¹ Such categorial syntaxes are revealed by abstracting the material content from the categorial formations through the syntactical operation of formalization. This dematerializing process of abstraction makes the cores of categorial objectivities indeterminate. Its remaining categorial formations become empty, formal ontologies. These disclosed categorial syntaxes become the subject matter of logical analytics as a formal apophantics. Logical analytics as a formal ontology analyzes the core formations of categorial objectivities. A shift in thematic interest may occur in logical analytics from formal ontology to formal apophantics. This shift in thematizing focus makes possible the study of categorial syntaxes of predicative judgments.

The first type of categorial syntax is the predicatively formed affair complexes of simple categorial judgments. These categorialia are known as supposed objectivities as supposed.¹² They bear judgment sense upon the lower sublevel of the second level of conscious activity. Supposed objectivities as supposed may be verified as true through the identifying coincidence between the posited state of affairs of acts

of judgment and the presented state of affairs of actual experience. Before this identifying coincidence occurs in verification, however, the supposed objectivities as supposed are merely provisional categorial objectivities. These provisional categorialia may be accepted as true only when their judgments are verified evidentially in experience. As opposed to merely supposed evidence, this evidence must be genuine evidence of a sufficient degree of clarity. The truth of a predicative judgment is attained intuitively through perfect evidence. Perfect evidence is characterized mainly by maximum clarity of categorial objectivities within their predicative judgments. Judgment sense merges from clearly intuited supposed objectivities as supposed within simple categorial judgments. The judging subject not only perceives objects, he has also reflected clearly upon his acquired perceptions.

The predicative structures of categorial objectivities possess a highly determined developmental aspect. The predicative judgment or assertion as a self-contained unity of determination is always given preeminence (i.e., the whole takes precedence over its parts).¹³ Other categorial objectivities function within predicative judgments as their components. Other categorial suppositions may function as component parts within predicative judgments. In other words, simple categorial judgments may be formulated within complex categorial judgments. Categorial syntax permits the entailment of one simple judgment within another more complex judgment. For example, "the red box is large" (i.e., "*sp* is *q*") becomes "the large, red box" (i.e., "*spq*") in a case wherein a simple categorial judgment is contained within a complex categorial judgment. Thus, within reflective thought from one type of categorial syntax, there arises easily another form of categorial syntax. This judgmental activity takes place through the *rethematization* of predicatively formed affair complexes with judgment sense within simple categorial judgments into predicatively constituted states of affairs with logical sense within complex categorial judgments. Thus, a categorial judgment may evolve simply, as it were, from one sublevel to another upon the same level of conscious activity.

IV. The Formation of Syntactica within Predicative Judgments

The categorialia of lower predicative judgments (e.g., "*s* is *p*") may be rethematized into the syntactical form of higher predicative judgments (e.g., "That '*s* is *p*' is regrettable."). This rethematization of the basic logical form is the consequence of the noetic activity of nominalization. Nominalization is the constitutive process through which the many-rayed theses of an ego's attention become synthesized into a single ray. It applies to both prelogical forms and the predicative structure which our study has examined so far. More precisely, when the property of an object makes its appearance as a predicate to a subject in the formulation of a categorial judgment, it is nominalized into the substrate-form property.¹⁴ A property of an object is a categorial form within a *lower* sublevel predicative judgment. If a plurality of properties makes its appearance in *predication* as a substrate, then it is thematized into a set. A set is a syntactical form within a *higher* sublevel predicative

judgment. Thus a syntactica is merely a rethematized categorialia on a higher sublevel of judgmental activity upon the second level of conscious activity.

Predicative judgments are directed to categorial objectivities or to predicational affair complexes through the thematization of categorial and syntactical forms. New judgmental syntaxes have become the objects of reflection. For instance, if we have formulated the predicative judgment, “*s* is *p*”, then this lower sublevel categorial formation may be thematized further into a new, higher sublevel syntactical formation “That ‘*s* is *p*’ is regrettable”.¹⁵ This new syntactical form is as objective as previous categorial forms. As with previous judgmental forms, thematization occurs by focusing attention upon the *objects*, *not* upon the *forms* of judgments. New syntactical forms arise as a consequence of acts of identity. These syntheses of identification are a result of a unitarily determining effect on lower sublevel substrates by the form “the same”. The objectivity of this newly created syntactical form is preserved in turn by the form of “Something in general”. The judgmental forms of property, plurality, set, etc., are derived from the form of “Something-in-general”. In other words, “Something-in-general” is the fundamental formal category at work in the constitution of an object.¹⁶ The object of a judgment remains the *same* throughout changes in judgment syntax because these syntaxes are traceable ultimately to “Something-in-general”. Thus, there may be different types of predicative judgments with the same object. Thematization does *not* alter objectivity.

Syntactical operations function dually to create new categorial objectivities and to preserve old syntactical forms.¹⁷ Syntactical operations create new forms of judgment syntax and preserve categorial objectivities as “objects” for higher predicative judgments. More exactly, syntactical operations preserve the identity of a categorial objectivity throughout changes in judgment syntax. As opposed to their role as “objects” of reflection, the form of a categorial objectivity changes as the objectivity is reconstituted from one sublevel of conscious activity to another. The thematizing focus of attention remains directed objectively throughout the rethematization of an objectivity. Since they are constituted in the objective focus, categorial and syntactical forms are ontological forms of objectivity. Syntactical operations permit the development of these ontological forms of objectivity because they preserve old forms simultaneously as they create new ones.

Upon closer inspection, it should be noted that the nominalization of categorial objectivities into a syntactical objectivity (e.g., a set) is fundamentally a further development of the nominalization of different-layered acts of presentation. The properties of acts of presentation in a “collective” synthesis are constituted into a collective object of a single-rayed thesis.¹⁸ A predicational synthesis of a higher predicative judgment functions analogously to a “collective” synthesis of a lower predicative judgment. Predicational synthesis reunifies a substrate and its properties by rethematizing the components of a predicatively formed affair complex into a predicatively constituted state of affairs. A “collective” synthesis unifies the plural properties of acts of presentation in the presented object of a *new* nominalized act. The major difference between these two types of synthesis is logical articulation. A single-rayed thesis of acts of presentation is not articulated logically.¹⁹ The nomina-

lization of acts of presentation occurs on the first level of an ego's objectivating activity. This first level of an ego's objectification is that of perceptual activity. Perceptual experience employs prelogical forms. Logical articulation does *not* occur in perceptual experience; it begins with the formulation of judgments of perception. Furthermore, the nominalization of a substrate and its properties in predication occurs upon the second level of conscious activity. On this level of objectification, predicative judgments are formulated through the synthesis of subject and predicate terms, as two logically articulated components of nominalization.

The result of nominalization is an enhancement of objectivity. As previously mentioned, the "syntactica" of higher predicative judgments are constituted as a consequence of the rethematization of the "categorialia" of lower predicative judgments. This rethematization is a nominalizing of predicatively constituted states of affairs (e.g., "That 's is p' regrettable") from predicatively formed affair complexes (e.g., "This, that 's is p' "). This nominalization of categorial forms into syntactical forms enhances the element of coherence in the substrate objectivities. The substrate objectivities of the categorialia of lower predicative judgments become unified more coherently through their reconstitution into the syntactica of higher-level predicative judgments. Greater objectivity, in addition to greater complexity of categorial objectivity, is the consequence of further thematization, especially nominalization.

The noetic activity of rethematization makes possible the constitution of categorial objectivities within different types of predicative judgments. There emerge various kinds of sense with the formulation of different types of judgment. The judgment sense of simple categorial judgments becomes the logical sense of complex categorial judgments. The latter sense is a consequence of the reiteration of the synthesis leading to the former sense. More specifically, the logical aspect of predicative spontaneity permits a completely new predication of the component parts of the categorial objectivity to take place in constitution (e.g., *sp, q, r*, become *S* and *T* and *U*).²⁰ In other words, through productive spontaneity, a new iteration of predication results in the emergence of a new kind of meaning. The judgment sense of a predicatively formed affair complex within a simple categorial judgment has become the logical sense of a predicatively constituted state of affairs within a complex categorial judgment. Rethematization permits the properties of an object to become the pluralities of a set. This set represents a new type of categorial objectivity. It is *not* the consequence of a new mode of predication; rather, it is merely the result of predication synthesis. In turn, predication synthesis is merely a reenactment or reiteration of "collective" synthesis. In other words, the first iteration of "collective" synthesis constitutes the predicatively formed affair complex of simple categorial judgments with judgment sense. The second iteration of "collective" synthesis or predication synthesis presents the predicatively constituted state of affairs of complex categorial judgments with logical sense. Only *one* type of synthesis functions in each case; it operates once in the former instance and twice in the latter. The logical aspect of predication spontaneity during the second iteration permits logical sense to emerge as a new kind of meaning.

The formation of syntactica from categoralia, of complex categorial judgments from simple categorial judgments, and of logical sense from judgment sense affords a good example of the upward development of judgmental components from very simple to more complex forms. This developmental aspect of Husserl's theory of judgment is the result of the syntactical operations of nominalization and thematization. The noetic activities constitute the newly formed noemata of predicative judgments. Husserl's phenomenological inquiry into the origin of predicative judgments reveals the noetic activities, as well as the judgmental forms, at work in the formulation of predicative judgments.

V. The Constitution of Empirical Generalities within Empirical Judgments "In General"

General objectivities of the understanding are constituted upon the third level of an ego's objectivation activity. There are two types of generalities: empirical and pure. Our study will consider *how* empirical generalities are acquired upon the lower sublevel in this present section. In the next section, we will treat the appearance of pure generalities upon the higher sublevel of conscious activity. The presentation of these two types of generalities marks the zenith in Husserl's theory of judgment regarding the constitution of complex categorial objectivities.

Empirical generalities themselves are concepts of concrete, empirical objects. They comprise the epistemic means by which we become aware of the empirical characteristics of concrete objects. More specifically, these epistemic means are two distinct types of synthesis: a preconstitutive synthesis of association and constitutive synthesis of productive spontaneity. A preconstitutive synthesis of association is a *passive* synthesis of the coincidence of likeness. A constitutive synthesis of productive spontaneity is really an *active* synthesis of the logical forms of spontaneity. It is important to note what these relatively complicated syntheses finally accomplish — namely, the presentation of empirical objects in perception. A close examination of both these key syntheses will reveal exactly how the concepts of empirical objects or empirical generalities permit perception to take place.

The preconstitution of an empirical generality begins through the associative synthesis of "like with like". A preconstitutive synthesis of "like with like" is preliminary to any other type of synthesis, such as a synthesis of identity. Through this preconstitutive synthesis of the coincidence of likeness, there is established a new mode of judgments "in general".²¹ Thus, this passive preconstitution of "like with like" is foundational both for other kinds of more active syntheses and for the development of a new modality of judgment. The preconstitutive synthesis of the coincidence of likeness warrants detailed analysis. It will then be followed by a concise consideration of the constitutive synthesis of productive spontaneity.

With the coincidence of likeness of the synthesis of association, a unity is constituted through the passage from one like moment to another. A unity emerges from the various forms of property p (e.g., p' , p'' , etc.) as they are predicated of

the various forms of its substrate S (e.g., S' , S''). In addition to the predication of properties to substrates in a first series of judgments, there is the predication of the property p as a universal form. It is that which emerges as identical in the subsequent properties p' , p'' , etc.²² The unity of the species p is preconstituted in the passive coincidence of likeness of the moments p' , p'' , etc. Predication has now gone beyond attribution or enumeration. Predicates are *not* being assigned individually to substrates (e.g., S is p , Sp is q). Substrates are *not* being enumerated individually into a coherent series (e.g., S , S_1 , S_2 , S_3). Rather, in this process of preconstitution, the substrate is returned to and its identification is reeffected [e.g., Sp , Sp^2 (Sp^1), Sp^3 (Sp^2) Sp^1]. Subsequent substrates are *not* predicated by individual moments of p . They are predicated by p as identically the same in the cases of S , S' , etc. In other words, p is no longer an individual predicate core. It has now become a general core or generality. The predicate is common to two or more substrates as they are apprehended successively. These new generalities are characteristic of universal judgments. They are empirical generalities of universal judgments "in general".

The direction of interest toward universality or toward unity rather than toward multiplicity is *not* founded upon the passive synthesis of the coincidence of likeness. The awakening of interest occurs through the *individual apprehension* of that which is preconstituted passively on the basis of the coincidence of likeness. The "one" is apprehended individually.²³ The "one" is apprehended actively as it comes into prominence through the coincidence of likeness. It is identically the same regardless of the direction of our interest. The "one" is given only once in many likenesses. It arises from the original sources of productive activity as a new kind of objectivity of the understanding. This new type of general objectivity is apprehended individually and is combined into an infinite extension of open horizons.²⁴ The possibility of the formation of general objectivities extends as far as the number of associative syntheses of likeness. In the case of empirical generalities, the formation of these generalities rests upon the actual extension of associative syntheses of likeness. The constitution of empirical generalities pertains to actual things and real possibilities (e.g., the world of actual, real experiences and its possibilities). Through the constitutive activity of empirical concepts, the ego perceives concrete, empirical objects. Although these empirical concepts are produced actively, they presuppose the preconstituted passivity of the associative synthesis of like moments.

Empirical generalities are constituted in accordance with the degrees of likeness of the members of their extension. From the experience of individual objects the lowest universal arises from the repetition of independent but completely alike or similar individuals. These original individual objects are concrete.²⁵ All individuals are particular concrete generalities. The lowest and most independent generality is the concrete individual or concretum. A concretum is an independent essence.²⁶ It is a completely independent universal. It exists upon the lowest level of the hierarchy of generalities. Because it is not founded upon any type of generality, a concretum is able to found abstract generalities. These abstract generalities are the

dependent generalities of abstract species.²⁷ An abstract generality or a dependent essence is an abstractum.²⁸ As independent generalities, abstract species are constituted upon the second level of generalities. Abstract generalities emerge from concrete generalities through their likeness or degrees of similarity. The emergence of an abstract generality from a concrete generality occurs if the likeness of the individual members of the extension of a generality is no longer a complete likeness. Likeness itself is the limit of similarity.²⁹ A new generality emerges when the likeness of an incomplete generality has reached the limit of its partial similarity. Incomplete likeness attains only partial similarity. Complete likeness signifies total similarity. Abstract generalities develop from concrete generalities because concrete generalities possess incomplete likeness or partial similarity. Universal similarity arises on a higher level of generality. A universal similarity is founded upon two or more dependent empirical generalities. Whenever universal ideas (e.g., red or blue) are compared, a new type of generality is constituted (e.g., color). This new generality with universal similarity emerges from the comparison of the universal ideas of other generalities. Any generality comes to self-givenness in the synthetic activity of its constitution.

It is apparent that the constitution of an abstract generality is based upon the degrees of similarity of particular moments of a concrete generality. A particular concrete generality or *concretum* founds higher abstract generalities. Our study is concerned primarily with these higher abstract generalities, *not* with concrete generalities (i.e., these abstract generalities are empirical generalities).

Empirical generalities may be either material or formal.³⁰ Material generalities or purely material concepts are constituted through the synthesis of the coincidence of likeness. They comprise the content of passive perceptual experience (e.g., colors, such as red or blue). Formal generalities or purely logical concepts are formed from the likeness which belongs to the syntactical forms of productively spontaneous activity. They do not possess a determined material content (e.g., likeness, difference, unity, plurality, whole, part, object, property). Thus, likeness is common both to material and formal generalities because it makes possible their formation. In each case it operates differently, however. Material generalities are produced from the passive dyadic syntheses of the coincidence of likeness. Formal generalities develop through active monadic syntheses of the likenesses of the syntactical forms of productive spontaneity. Both types of empirical generalities are constituted within the same hierarchy in accordance with the degrees of likeness which they share in common.

This hierarchy of empirical generalities entails three different types of generalities: concrete, individual generalities; abstract, individual generalities; and generalities with universal similarity.³¹ These three types of empirical generalities are categorial objectivities of empirical judgments "in general". It may be surmised that empirical generalities bear or carry a "conceptual sense".³² This meaning emerges with the constitution of material or formal generalities within empirical judgments "in general". It is simply the sense which is common both to purely material concepts (e.g., red or blue as colors) and to purely formal or logical concepts (e.g.,

unity, plurality, whole, part). It provides meaning for judgments which are concerned either with a conceptual understanding of empirical reality (i.e., in the case of material generalities) or with a conceptual comprehension of our reflection upon empirical reality (i.e., in the case of formal generalities). Thus, the “conceptual sense” of empirical generalities within empirical judgments “in general” permits us *to understand* meaningfully *both* our perception of and reflection upon empirical reality. It is the consequence of the most sophisticated judgments which can be made about empirical reality.

It should be noted that the preconstitutive and constitutive syntheses are the key to understanding the formation of empirical generalities. These syntheses are either *preparatory* for constitution or *actually* constitute empirical generalities of the understanding. In the *acquisition* of pure generalities, however, the idea of a universal appears in eidetic intuition through the method of essential seeing. Constitution and acquisition are different presentational activities of cognition. From the syntheses, there are formed different types of categorial objectivities (i.e., empirical as opposed to “a priori” generalities of the understanding). Not only must these different types of constitution remain separate from each other, but their epistemic formations must also be kept distinct. It should be noted that the *constitution* of material or formal empirical generalities is caused by either preconstitutive or constitutive *syntheses* (i.e., the passive synthesis of the coincidence of likeness or the active synthesis of productive spontaneity). However, the *acquisition* of pure generalities, as we shall see shortly, is accomplished through one of three different methods of abstraction (i.e., generalization, eidetic abstraction, and essential seeing). Constitution is *not* acquisition; syntheses are *not* methods of abstraction; and empirical generalities are *not* pure generalities.

VI. The Acquisition of Pure Generalities within “A Priori” Judgments “In General”

Judgments “in general” are formulated with either empirical or pure generalities for their cores. These types of judgments are *not* concerned with objects of concrete existence. They are formulated about individuals only as instances of essential being. Judgments “in general” are indeterminate universal judgments.³³ They are either particular or universal judgments of eidetic generality. A particular judgment “in general” refers to a concrete particular instance of what is asserted generally. A universal judgment “in general” pertains to an abstract universal instance of what is posited generally. In other words, judgments, which are formulated in the mode “in general” upon the third level of conscious activity, are completely categorial regarding their referents.

Generalization is the basic operation by which judgments about individual entities may be transformed into judgments of eidetic generality. Through generalization the form of an individual judgment becomes the form of a judgment “in general”. This alteration in the form of judgment takes place by dequalifying the form of the categorial judgment in each case. It should be noted that dequalifica-

tion pertains solely to the form of the judgment, *not* to its content. Generalization itself is a method of abstraction which includes differences among judgmental forms. When the judgmental form of an individual judgment is generalized into the form of a particular or universal judgment “in general”, a pure generality has been formed within an “a priori” judgment “in general”. This pure generality is in fact an eidetic generality.

Pure generalities may also be formed through the method of eidetic abstraction. Eidetic abstraction is the means by which the universal objects of cognition are brought to appearance in consciousness.³⁴ The universal object of cognition is given as an individually universal object. It is also the creation of a new syntactical objectivity or a new syntactica. This new syntactica is an objectivity of essences. The appearance of an objectivity of essences marks the beginning of assertions about essences. These essences are given in pure “seeing”, but *not* as genuinely immanent. The essence of a new objectivity is genuinely transcendent. It is also “a priori” within absolute self-givenness. This absolute self-givenness is pure evidence. Pure evidence is the pure viewing or grasping of something objective directly and in itself. On the other hand, the act of cognizing the universal object is singular. It is unique because no two acts of pure “seeing” are identically the same acts of cognition. In addition to their numerical difference, each act of pure “seeing” possesses uniqueness unto itself.

For example, I may grasp fully the *meaning* of the concept of redness in general or redness in *specie* through pure “seeing”.³⁵ It is the *universal* “seen” as *identical* in these particular instances of redness. A pure generality is the general essence of the meaning of redness and its givenness is general “seeing”. This general essence is presented as a general state of affairs which is given in immediate intuition.³⁶ This pure “seeing” or immediate intuition of an essential *eidos* or pure generality is the direct application of the method of eidetic abstraction. Its consequence is the presentation of pure generalities within “a priori” judgments “in general”.

So far our study of the acquisition of pure generalities of “a priori” judgments “in general” has focused upon generalization and eidetic abstraction. A third method of abstraction is that of free variation of an *eidos* within imagination. The variation of an *eidos* occurs within the freedom of pure phantasy, and within the consciousness of its purely optional character — the consciousness of the “pure” Any Whatever.³⁷ Variation extends to an open horizon of endlessly manifold free possibilities of variants. Free possible variants stand in a continuous and all-inclusive synthesis of “coincidence in conflict”. An invariant arises from this conflict of free possible variants.³⁸ This invariant or constant is indifferent to the differences among the variants. It is the essence which is common to all the “imaginable” variants of the chosen example (i.e., the meaning of the concept of redness in general). The invariant is the ontic essential form or *eidos* of the chosen example. It stands in the place of any particular variant. The invariant is universal in a representational way in addition to its own inherent aprioriness. This invariant becomes the new syntactica of “a priori” judgments “in general”. More precisely, as a pure generality this invariant becomes the universal idea of judgments “in general”. In

other words, as a higher-level concept the “pure” any whatever sets limits to the process of variation of the universal *eidos*. The formation of a universal *eidos* through free variation of an idea within imagination results in the acquisition of a pure generality within an “a priori” judgment “in general”.

The acquisition of pure generalities within “a priori” judgments “in general” is accompanied by the emergence of “eidetic sense”.³⁹ “Eidetic sense” is simply the meaning of the content of a judgmental form which has been abstracted in one of the foregoing three ways from an individual to a universal essence. Each method of abstraction (i.e., generalization, eidetic abstraction, and free variation of an *eidos* within imagination) produces a pure generality with “eidetic sense”. The degree of universality of the pure generality enhances as one moves from one method of abstraction to another. The “eidetic sense” of the pure generality is the *meaning* of the universal concept of something (i.e., redness as a chosen example) which is presented within “a priori” judgments “in general”. This “eidetic sense” of the pure generality as a universal essence enables conscious activity to acquire meaning from the universality of its concepts. These concepts, in turn, are abstractions from the original experience of individual judgments (i.e., individuals of essential being).

The three ways of acquiring a pure generality are: generalization, eidetic abstraction, and free variation of an *eidos* within imagination. Of these three methods of abstraction, free variation of an *eidos* within imagination represents Husserl’s distinctive contribution to theories of abstraction.⁴⁰ The method of essential seeing also comprises Husserl’s theory of imagination. It marks the apex of his theory of categorial judgment and the zenith of his phenomenological inquiry into the genealogy of judgment.

VII. The Possibility of Predication according to Husserl’s Theory of Categorial Judgment

After detailed analysis it seems that Husserl’s theory of predicative judgment is free of logical inconsistency or conceptual errors. The various three structural levels are developed in such a way that the theory is devoid of symmetrical flaws. Each structural level presupposes its lower levels in a cumulative fashion. A higher and more complex level presupposes a lower and simpler level of conscious activity. The entire result of reflection becomes a mosaic of constituted objectivities, formulated judgments, and manifested meanings.

Any logically coherent theory possesses the possibility of being true. With the case of phenomenology, truth is ascertainable in accordance with a rationalist criterion of truth. This criterion of truth is *not* clarity in accordance with internal evidence. An intuitionist theory of truth, as expressed in the early Husserlian writings, is not sufficient enough to establish the truth or falsehood of his theory of categorial judgment. A stronger criterion of truth is needed in order to either verify or falsify this particular theory. Its formulation is certainly clear. Its truth or falsehood does *not* depend upon more clarity.

Verification of Husserl's theory of categorial judgment takes place in accordance with the method of transcendental reflection. A transcendental philosophy can be verified rationally only in accordance with the correspondence between abstract ideas or mental objects (i.e., ideational entities). The proper type of verification for this theory is rationalistic (e.g., the truths of mathematics). The rich resources of transcendental reflection are not verified empirically. Conscious activity is composed of ideas, not of the empirical objects to which ideas refer perceptually. Although intentionality permits concrete objects to be known perceptually through perceptual experience, categorial judgments require further verification. Verification refers to the components of the theory of judgment itself, *not* to the phenomena which the theory was developed to explain. There can be no purely external correspondence theory of truth for a philosophy of rationalism. Truth is ascertainable solely internally through the exercise of strong powers of reflection upon our previous objects of awareness. As with mathematics, the truths of phenomenology lie with the proofs of logical consistency and of the awareness of our experience of formulating judgments. This awareness furnishes the evidence whereby the theory may be either verified or falsified. In other words, the awareness of the experience of formulating a simple predicative judgment (e.g., *S is p*) makes possible the verification of the theory of categorial judgment. We may acquire awareness of *how* judgments are formulated. In this particular instance the "how" is informative of the "what" within conscious activity.

Rational verification is a privileged form of epistemic proof. It exists for phenomenology in a manner analogous to the proofs of higher mathematics. The evidence is accessible only to those few individuals with certain talents and specialized training. This type of proof is rational because the phenomena require it to be so in each case. Verification is simply not procurable in any other fashion. Rational proof is acquired through the internal correspondence of abstract ideas with other ideational objects. The former verifies the latter through reflection upon them.

It appears that Husserl's approach to transcendental reflection may be criticized upon the grounds of its starting point and reference. He ignored the primary of sentences over names regarding the "reference to objects".⁴¹ Upon closer analysis, however, it appears that a sentence is *not* the primary unit of meaning. A sentence is a linguistic structure; it is interpreted grammatically. "Reference to objects" is conveyed by names. Names are understood in terms of meanings. They appear within categorial judgments as a consequence of their formulation. The grammatical expression of names in a logically articulated sentence is a secondary matter of concern. It presupposes a phenomenologically accessible foundation of mental entities. This foundation of ideational activity is primary. There must be ideas or there would be nothing which the words are about. If ideas were not primary to words, there would be no internal referent for a word. Words are merely the linguistic expression of the ideas of conscious activity.

It might also be added that the ego and object poles are the two basic epistemic elements present throughout conscious activity. The subject refers to its object

through its intentional activity. The universal system of reference is comprised of objective correlates of either objects of perception, or categorial and syntactical objectivities, or empirical and pure generalities as they are presented within consciousness. Intersubjective communication in language makes the meanings of expressions public. This intersubjective linguistic communication is *not* primary; it is secondary to the appearance of meanings within judgments.⁴² Otherwise, what is there to be communicated? Something must be thought rationally before it can be said linguistically in the public context of verbal or written communication.

It has been claimed that Husserl maintained an untenable concept of an object.⁴³ "Object" as a subject of true predicates and "object" as a referent for acts with thetic qualities are not mistakes. They do not preclude the taking of a sentence as a unit of meaning or as a starting point for the analysis of meanings.⁴⁴ Rather, "object" as a subject of true predicates is a logical interpretation of the concept of an object. "Object" as a referent for acts with thetic qualities asserts an epistemic utilization of the concept of an object. Both interpretations of an "object" have solid foundations in phenomenology. If anything, these two interpretations of the concept of an object enhance the meaning of "object" throughout Husserl's philosophy. They simply serve entirely different purposes. The former interpretation of the concept of an object serves the purpose of logical predication in any fully articulated proposition. The latter interpretation of the concept of an object furnishes the epistemic means (i.e., the object pole) by which an intentional object is presented through an intentional act in intentional experience. Both interpretations of the concept of an object are completely tenable phenomenologically. Neither concept of an object is a mistake because it precludes the sentence as the starting point for the analysis of meaning. Taking the sentence as the starting point for the analysis of meaning is the mistake. It is mistaken because it bears no epistemological value as a starting point for analysis. It does not explain how knowledge is possible. The concept of an object as the subject of true predicates explains how logical predication is possible. Likewise, the concept of an object as the referent for acts with thetic qualities explains partly how cognition occurs. Hence, both interpretations of the concept of an object serve legitimate purposes within Husserlian phenomenology.

Logical predication is possible as a consequence of the syntheses of objectification. Syntheses of objectification (e.g., categorial, "syntactical" or predicative, and predication) comprise the epistemic means by which there occurs a logic to predication. In other words, these syntheses are crucial for the formation of the whole from the parts in accordance with a whole-parts logic. The general thematizing operation of nominalization is the key type of thematization. Through it, these three basic types of syntheses are able to create higher-level objectivities within predicative judgments. Without nominalization there would be no thematic means by which to formulate predicative judgments.

The basic types of syntheses and the thematizing operation of nominalization are the constitutive factors at work in the formulation of predicative judgments. Through the constitution of categorial objectivities as the new formations within

types of judgments, various kinds of meaning emerge in conscious activity. These senses are founded within the ideational activity of judgment formations. They are explained in considerable detail throughout the later writings of Edmund Husserl.

NOTES

1. Ernst Tugendhat, "Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis," in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*, ed. Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 325–37. Without engaging in polemics, I would like to offer a defense of the Husserlian theory of judgment in regard to predication. This defense will be a careful exposition of the theory of predicative judgment. Its purpose is the presentation of the Husserlian position through an analysis of the theory itself.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 335–36. With all due respect to his very successful research as an Husserlian scholar, it seems to me that Ernst Tugendhat simply goes too far with his later disclaimers, which are based upon linguistic analysis.
3. Francis J. Kelly, "The Structural and Developmental Aspects of the Formulation of Categorical Judgments in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1978), esp. pp. 77–207. Cf. this account of Husserl's analysis of simple and complex judgments. I would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of Robert Sokolowski of Catholic University and the expert direction of John Brough of Georgetown University toward the composition of this manuscript.
4. Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 203 (181); *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*, ed. Paul Janssen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 210 (181).
5. Robert Sokolowski, "Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic*," unpublished lecture notes (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1977), p. 19, no. 82.
6. Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment* (Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic), pp. 58–63; Edmund Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik), pp. 59–66. These passages are important texts for a brief overview of contemplative perception.
7. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, pp. 206–7 (184); *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*, p. 214 (184).
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 208–9 (185); *ibid.*, pp. 216–17 (185).
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 212 (188); *ibid.*, pp. 219–20 (188); Sokolowski, "Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic*," p. 19, no. 86.
10. The distinction between "implicit" and "explicit" thematization is mine, rather than Husserl's, in order to clarify how constitution occurs upon the different sublevels of the first level of conscious activity.
11. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 119 (106); *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*, p. 124 (106); Sokolowski, "Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 11, no. 43.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 122 (109); *ibid.*, p. 127 (109); *ibid.*, p. 11, no. 44.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 126 (112); *ibid.*, pp. 131–32 (112).
14. *Ibid.*, p. 107 (96); *ibid.*, p. 113 (96).
15. *Ibid.*, p. 112 (100); *ibid.*, p. 118 (100) — When I analyzed this particular passage, I went one step beyond Husserl's text in order to explain the development of higher sublevel syntactical forms. This additional step on my part is necessary in order to explain the noetic activity of "nominalizing" which results in the new form: "That 'S is P' 'regrettable'".
16. *Ibid.*, p. 114 (101); *ibid.*, p. 119 (101).
17. *Ibid.*, p. 114 (102); *ibid.*, p. 119 (102); Sokolowski, "Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic*," p. 10, no. 42.

18. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 639–40; *Logische Untersuchungen* (Halle A.D.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1913), pp. 480–83. *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 294 (259); *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*, pp. 299–300 (259).
19. Ibid., *ibid.*, *ibid.*, *ibid.*
20. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment* (Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic), pp. 232–35, 244–48; *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik), pp. 276–80, 292–96.
21. Ibid., p. 323; *ibid.*, pp. 387–88.
22. Ibid., p. 324; *ibid.*, pp. 389–90.
23. Ibid., p. 326; *ibid.*, p. 391.
24. Ibid., p. 329; *ibid.*, p. 395.
25. Ibid., pp. 334–35; *ibid.*, pp. 403–4.
26. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York: Collier, 1967), p. 68; *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, ed. Karl Schuhmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 35.
27. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, p. 335; *Erfahrung und Urteil*, pp. 403–4.
28. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 68; *Ideen zur einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, p. 35.
29. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, p. 335; *Erfahrung und Urteil*, p. 404.
30. Ibid., pp. 337–38; *ibid.*, pp. 407–8.
31. Ibid., pp. 334–38; *ibid.*, pp. 403–8.
32. Once again, “conceptual sense” is my term for the kind of meaning which arises from empirical generalities within empirical judgments “in general”. After a discussion with Robert Sokolowski, it seems that Husserl never mentions a specific name for this particular meaning, so I reluctantly offer “conceptual sense” as a reasonable possibility in lieu of a stated appellation.
33. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 52; *Ideen zur einer Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, p. 18.
34. Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. William Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 6 (8); *Die Idee der Phanomenologie*, edited with Introduction by Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 8 (8).
35. Ibid., p. 45 (57); *ibid.*, p. 57 (57).
36. Ibid., p. 46 (58); *ibid.*, p. 58 (58).
37. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, pp. 247–48 (219); *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*, pp. 254–55 (219).
38. Ibid., *ibid.*
39. Once again, “eidetic sense” is my term for the kind of meaning which arises from “a priori” generalities within “a priori” judgments “in general”. After a conversation with Robert Sokolowski, it seems that Husserl never mentions a specific name for this particular meaning. So I hesitantly suggest “eidetic sense” as a plausible term in the absence of any other alternative (cf. note 32).
40. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, pp. 340–48; *Erfahrung und Urteil*, pp. 410–20 for a detailed account of the method of essential seeing or free variation of an *eidos* within imagination.
41. Ernst Tugendhat, “Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis,” p. 336.
42. Ibid. Ernst Tugendhat’s initial insight of intersubjective communication in language as the new system of reference constitutes the fundamental error in his understanding of sentences as the starting point for the analysis of meaning.
43. Ibid., p. 334. Ernst Tugendhat’s basic error in this instance is his utilization of Husserl’s early writings only (e.g., *Logical Investigation* and *Ideas*) rather than his middle and later works (e.g., *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Experience and Judgment*).
44. Of course, preclusion does not imply acceptance.

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